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SUBJECTS: ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS; GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON; CENTRAL CONTRACTORS ASSOCIATION; VOICE MOVEMENT; AFFIRMATIVE ACTION; TRADES WORKERS OF COLOR; DANIEL EVANS; IDEOLOGY; KING COUNTY; REPUBLICANS; KING COUNTY PROSECUTOR; NATIONAL GUARD; POLITICAL CONFLICTS, PORT OF SEATTLE; CHARLES O'CARROLL; JOHN SPELLMAN; SHUT DOWN; BUILDING TRADES; FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

LOCATION: SEATTLE, WASHINGTON

DATE: NOVEMBER 24, 1975

INTERVIEW LENGTH: 00:27:32

FILE NAME: DolliverJim_WLOHP_1975_Audio_acc2610-003.mp3

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[00:00:00] **JIM:** The biggest building was the Seattle airport complex, that was where the real fire was concentrated. From the builders standpoint, first of all he wanted to get buildings built, and secondly he wanted to avoid violent confrontation, and thirdly he was interested to see to it that minority persons were fairly hired in the building trades. Of course, as you know he is an engineer by profession, and as such, he knew all the players, which made him different from most governors. I don't know politically, but professionally he went to law school with St. Laurent and with the people in AGC [Associated General Contractors], and he had been an employee with AGC at one time, so he was a little bit different than perhaps most people because of his experience as an engineer, particularly a person who had worked on construction.

I think we had some feeling that proved to be entirely wrong that the building trades would be very reasonable, that they were persuaded that the AGC meant business, they persuaded the government meant business, and—in one area we were never quite sure where the federal government was, that this was in the time of the Philadelphia Plan, as you recall, and we kept going back and forth with them. I guess in the final analysis our feeling was against the federal government did mean business, and we consistently tried to get them—I have to go back and review my notes—there were certain times that we would try to get the federal government to act on our behalf, to get them to accept our proposals that we consistently couldn't get them to do it. For what reason, I don't know why, because we didn't meet their standards, or whether they had other problems back East that they were taking care of, or whether it was some other factor, I don't know the reason. We didn't get what I considered to be all that much support. I went over to [Arthur] Fletcher's office, because Art was excellent when he moved up into the under secretary, in the secretary's position in the Labor Department, he was really not sure they were with us at least as we wanted them to be with us. We had these two meetings down here with the CCA [Central Contractors Association] and with the AGC, with Austin and his people. He expressed his views quite strongly, and they just wouldn't budge an inch. The governor [Daniel Evans] ... They just wouldn't budge an inch.

I think their response was essentially a political response, a twofold response: one, we weren't going to do anything, and we'll see you in court. But the political response was this VOICE, I don't know if there is anything on that contained in the file or not. But that was the political response, then they sent 4000 people down here and showed the governor that this kind of thing in the next election, you aren't going to have any votes. Well, that kind of stuff,... the governor, the thing disappeared as soon as it was formed. It had no staying power, in the meantime we had got ourselves in courts and rather than being something, who can decide on a policy matter, we decided on a legal matter. From our standpoint, it did not, the final result was ok, but what the governor was really trying to do was put his, kind of his whole position lean on it. The attending parties, the CCA, the AGC, and the building trades, if the governor brings them together and ought to be able to work out their differences without forcing everyone into court. That they should be able to agree on a plan, The Seattle Plan lets call it. That they would agree on that among themselves. It didn't work out, because the building trades didn't want it to work out. They took two actions, one was the political and one was the legal action. We will just fight the thing in court all the way. The other was the political action, this so called VOICE movement. From the standpoint of what he really wanted to do, the process of the goals we had some success. That was getting the minority persons into the trades.

[00:05:07] **WILLIAM:** Okay, I've got three questions in terms of the state government's response to the crisis. One was the governor issued an executive order in 1970, and the governor's office began to work with the Department of Highways. Then you had a legislative response. Did the governor's office begin to negotiate or..?

[00:05:38] **JIM:** I know one thing, let me just interject for a moment. The reason for the executive order was the governor's feeling that it was look, that we are going to tell everyone else that we are doing the same thing in our own business. Keeping your own shirts clean. I can't remember the legislative action for that, it's probably on the record.

[00:06:02] **WILLIAM:** Now let's go back. You said you didn't know exactly what was the problem because you couldn't get them to respond. It seems to me that at one time you went to discuss with the Department of Labor and another time you went to Senator [Warren] Magnuson's office.

[00:06:26] **JIM:** I don't think that I ever went back on that, though I may have, and if I did, I can't remember, I know that, I don't think that I ever went to Maggie's [Magnuson's] office, my major work was working with Art. I did work with him on several occasions, I don't think I went back as person out of this office, although I'm sure that we supported that through Senator Magnuson, we supported it anyway that we could get our hands

on. Through the administration, through the Congress, anyplace else, but I don't recall going back to that kind of a meeting. Although I may have.

[00:07:04] **WILLIAM:** Let's go back to the university, [?closure?] university, the statement and subsequently requesting that the state intervene. That was the initial part of governor [inaudible]. What was the feeling in the governor's office at that point in time?

[00:07:30] **JIM:** When something like that happens, I recall at the university, they pushed bulldozers into pits. I guess that we had several concerns, somebody getting serious injuries up there, even killed, we wanted to try to cool that off. Secondly, we obviously had an interest in getting the building built. And thirdly, the governor really looked upon himself at that time as being able to provide the forum, sort of a neutral forum—I'm not sure neutral is the right word—but sort of a forum where at least because of the prestige of his position, he could get people to come. I think that he felt that at least at the beginning that just get everybody together in the same room and get labor, and secretary of management, get the CCA, and have the university people there, and I think that we also may have had the Port of Seattle there. Get them involved, and get them to talk to each other, find out what CCA really wanted, find out what AGC really wanted, find out what the real position of the building trades were, and we might be able to strike a bargain, reach an agreement. All right we will have x number of people come in, that they will be able to negotiate in sort of a neutral area among themselves and come to an agreement. They weren't able to do it, certainly because the building trades did not want to negotiate.

[00:09:12] **WILLIAM:** Another thing, I wanted to ask you about some other records that indicate there was a series of meetings before the university and after the King County situation—The King County situation started around August or between September 8th to the 22nd and 23rd. I think the first demonstration was on the 22nd, and the major demonstration was on the 23rd. But there was—I think around the 15th or the 16th—a meeting between the governor's office and [?Lem Hall?] and a couple of other people.

[00:09:58] **JIM:** Yes, I remember it now, I can't tell you what happened there. You must think that I don't have a memory at all, but I swear I have a vague recollection. I remember the meeting with Lem, and he was the council for the CCA, as I recall, but I don't know what the sequence was.

[00:10:21] **WILLIAM:** I'm trying to piece that together because that's a very important point because there were some [negotiations] in the time between the demonstrations, and I can't ascertain. A certain thing happened here, then all of a sudden a few weeks later, you got [?devoured?].

[00:10:37] **JIM:** I know another thing that you can check if you meet with the governor, we keep the governor's books, his calendar books. I don't keep mine. The governor's bound volumes are kept now. I can check, if you've got the times. This was 1970?

[00:11:00] **WILLIAM:** 1969, September 16.

[LONG PAUSE, SHUFFLING OF PAPERS]

[00:11:37] **JIM:** That was on the 2nd. I don't have any meeting with Lem, I do know that I did see Lem, although I can't tell you when it was, but you are welcome to look through this stuff. I know Lem was either down here or I talked with him, but I—my feeling is that the meetings with him were not so much to try to resolve the thing, as they were asking, will the governor get the people together? Will the governor act as the catalyst or act as a forum to bring these people together? That was what Lem wanted to know.

[00:13:01] **WILLIAM:** Okay, that's important.

[00:13:04] **JIM:** I think what it really amounted to, the CCA came first and then joined by the AGC, came to the governor, and said, "Will you do this?" I'm sure it was the insistence of the CCA, and Lem was the contact point. Lem contacted Tyree [Scott], but I think Lem did the work in setting up the meeting.

The first real getting everybody together, really trying to get the thing resolved, didn't take place, until the governor got the parties in here together. I spent a lot of time in Seattle talking with the AGC, plus the CCA at the AGC office. I don't know how many meetings I had with them trying to—These meetings as I recall were primarily concerned with how do we get the federal government to do something, and how present a package from our end that the federal government will accept? That was what we continually had problems with, trying to get something together, that they would go for. What we really wanted to do is to get the federal government to come and also act as a lever against the building trades. But they were very acute. We had two or three proposals that we made to them. "Will you take this?" "Well we don't want that." "Will you take this?" They insisted we got to have all parties signatory. We said, "Look we can't get the building trades. We have the CCA, and the AGC, and the University, and the Port, and the governor, and the state, we can't get the building trades." I think that was where we constantly had a problem, they insisted that in order to get our money—we wanted to get money from this—they insisted in order to get any money, you had to have the building trades sign up, and we said, "Look we can't get the building trades, that is the whole issue. The building trades refused to agree." And we went round and round on that.

[00:15:28] **WILLIAM:** Now my next question is, what was the governor's position in regards to the reopening of the port after the Port of Seattle agreed to close the construction site? And I think the day after, which was sometime in November, or late September. And the Port, nothing really occurred. The second day, he shut it down, the [?parking lot?]. They shut the port construction site down, and they assured Tyree and the CCA that they would close that down until they met the requirements. The next day the governor's office called Tyree and said the Port had reopened the construction site.

[00:16:33] **JIM:** I don't know, I would have to go back and see if there is anything in the file to refresh my memory. He might recall. I cannot remember that.

[00:16:48] **WILLIAM:** Did the governor ever intend to call out the National Guard?

[00:16:50] **JIM:** No. When I say "no" he never intended to call them out, at no time during this whole series of events, did we ever get to the point that it was just a matter of hours before the Guard got called up. His feeling was always that you had the law enforcement officers without the army. The army's martial law, and he didn't like that. My recollection is that there was never a prospect of calling the Guard out. He'd certainly be in touch with them, but there were no plans, nothing was in the works to call them.

[00:17:45] **WILLIAM:** Another thing that seems to be, during this whole crisis, the governor's office was constantly in contact with the CCA regarding the planned demonstration and the various types of activities. Another thing which comes out beyond just that, the contact, was the fact that there were other elements in the community that wanted to take over the organization, take over the movement, and begin to perpetuate violence. What was the governor's position in terms of maintaining the CCA as a viable organization?

[00:18:20] **JIM:** I am not sure at that time that it was our impression that the CCA, there was a prospect of it being taken over. We felt that there were probably other organizations that may have benefitted from violent action, get injured and killed. There were organizations that might capitalize on that, but we didn't have the feeling the CCA and Tyree would have anything to do with that, they were part of a different operation. Or B, I

guess there was the feeling that when Tyree was running the show, that there was little chance of anybody being able to get around him. I guess that I would have to say that for matters of protecting ourselves we always had confidence in working with Tyree, and felt that it was, it didn't represent, that it was not a movement dedicated to violence, for the sake of violence. They had an issue, employment and they were doing everything that they could reasonably to accomplish that.

My recollection six years later, we didn't have the feeling that at that time that Tyree and his movement were really in any danger of being taken over, or that that organization "X" or whatever it might have been, was going to be able to move in. He completely dominated the scene. Because of his skills, because of the issues, because of the way the press handled it, I'm still not sure, but whatever it was, he was the only show in town. This is not to say that during this whole civil rights thing there were not lots of people competing in lots of groups, some of them were groups of one person, and some of them were groups of one person had put together, some were groups that had something to promote, I guess that we felt Tyree was the latter group, that it was not just Tyree, but Tyree plus a number of people. It was a movement that represented the major thinking of the black community, it certainly without any question presented the major thinking of the Black contractor. I had no opinion of any of them. Tyree was too soft, or Tyree was too hard. No opinion at any time. That was not the way the unanimous group wanted to go. I don't think that I could say that it was one of the reasons we worked with Tyree, was that if we didn't work with him, things would get in the hands of less desirable groups. I do think we felt that he was presenting a legitimate position that needed to have a response from the governor's office. We accommodated to the best of our ability. And what we felt was the best of our ability was to get the parties together and attempt to get them to make up their own minds, which was a solution with whatever help that we could get from the federal government, or public opinion, or anything else.

[00:22:28] **WILLIAM:** What was public opinion at the time, regarding this issue?

[00:22:36] **JIM:** I think that public opinion was probably in favor, the great mass of public opinion, I think that it is always very nervous when you have bulldozers pushed over the edge of holes in the ground, people always get nervous, that someone is going to get killed, and of course these were the times of CCA in context this was the time of the demonstrations at the community colleges, at the University of Washington, that same 1969, 1970 things were pretty tense. Not always having racial connotations. The Vietnamese war was probably what the real purpose was. My guess was that as to the issue that Tyree was pursuing that to most of his means, I think that he became, it becomes marginal when, you have, people begin to question when they see property destroyed, or they perceive that they see property destroyed. That makes the majority of the public very nervous. They also get extremely nervous when they see people getting hurt in the newspapers or on television. But as to the issue that was being promoted by him, I think that he had a majority of public opinion behind him.

[00:24:25] **WILLIAM:** So the conflict within the—not specifically the Republican party, but there was conflict within King County, between the county executive and the prosecutor. And John [Spellman] had developed a proposal, and the county prosecutor didn't want to accept it or legitimize it, that particular proposal. And I think that they sent a copy of the proposal to the attorney general, and he looked at it and made some modifications that allowed it to be legal and for them to present it to the council.

[00:25:15] **JIM:** I can't remember the precise document, I certainly can confirm that in 1969 there was very strong feeling from the executive on one hand and then plus the attorney general [Charles] O'Carroll on the other. As far as that goes, there is some even in this office, from a purely partisan political standpoint, the prosecutor's office tended to support the important people in King County who were not the supporters of either the governor or the King County executive. I'm not sure that—I don't want to make that more important than it

really was. We didn't find the county prosecutor's office particularly enthusiastic about trying to bring the building trades in line.

[00:26:15] **WILLIAM:** That was an ideological thing or what because—Let me tell you, in the Black community, O'Carroll has such a negative attitude, people have a really negative attitude towards him.

[00:26:26] **JIM:** I'm not sure that it is ideological or if it was just one of these power struggles, I've always looked towards the King County and the state Republican fight as being more who is going to be in charge, and that is articulated by the use of ideology. The right wing is opposed to the governor. Sure there are some people who are motivated on an ideological basis, but my view has been that the people who were really in charge of the King County operation, well they had different ideological views than the governor, but it was really who is going to be in charge, who is going to be in control. I think that was far more important, and the use of ideology was only there to get adherence and supporters to come to their side.